Chris Christie poised to momentarily stop eating donuts and veto NJ gay-marriage bill

Looks like New Jersey will be the next state to step into modernity, but only for a moment.

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Crawl to the Ethical Wall

I think most of us believe that being wholly moral isn't particularly easy. When we look to certain people as moral paragons, and ask ourselves "could I be like her?" we tend to respond: hell no. Sure certain ethical behaviors are pretty easy, for example it is relatively easy to avoid burning down orphanages, or to avoid strangling pelicans for kicks (or strangles), but a lot of what we take to be ethical behavior isn't so easy for most of us to do. That's why we admire those with the moral glow we take to be so difficult to achieve. When we hear that Joe Schmo donates 99% of his income to charity, volunteers his time to worthy causes, doesn't consume or use animal products, and abstains from purchasing equipment made by the third world demi-slaves of Apple, we think: that's great, but not for me. We tacitly acknowledge that it is the right way to behave, but see no problem with avoiding such behavior ourselves.

I can already hear you angrily typing SUPEREROGATORY!!!! We can acknowledge that what Joe Schmo does is good, but that doesn't mean we all ought to act that way, and it doesn't mean that we are acting unethically if we don't. Also, if ought implies can, then maybe Joe can but we can't so 'Joe ought' makes sense but 'I ought' doesn't (determinism essentially). I, like many people nowadays, do believe that our behavior is constrained by psychological contingencies and physical determinations totally outside of our control; however, I also believe that most people never rub up against these constraints. We can imagine these constraints as a wall that we reach in our ethical behavior. Our goal should be to smash into this wall, preferably at breakneck speed, possibly in Tron-like vehicles. So if someone says that they can't stop eating factory farmed meat, then this means that they think they've reached the constraining wall. Now I submit that most of us are nowhere near this constraining wall, hell most of us probably can't even see it. We use these constraints as tools to rationalize our morally lazy behavior but we shouldn't because I think we have room to maneuver. I also think that our moral character should (maybe) be judged based on our proximity to the constraining wall, not based on our proximity to a perfectly moral Mary Sue or Joe Schmo (unless of course we have the same psycho-deterministic constraints). But I also believe that none of us are as constrained as we like to think, being moral is still hard, even in this slightly less hard way. If you think some apparent ethical demand is too demanding, you damn well better be molesting that wall. It is often said that the likes of Peter Singer propound a far too demanding ethical theory, and maybe this is true, but maybe our walls aren't as far from Singer's idealized wall as we like to think.

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You Kant be Serious!

(A quick note about the title of this post: this play on words is completely novel; endemic to my mind alone, marvel at it.)

I've always been interested in the role that motivation ought to play in our moral assessments of any given person's actions. It has always seemed to me that answers to questions like: Why did this person act as they did? or: What beliefs and desires motivated them to act in such a way? should play some role in our judgment of actions. Some moral theories certainly have more trouble accounting for motivation than others, but most can probably accommodate motivation in some way (even if indirectly)

If you don't think motive matters consider this test case:
Imagine two guys: Rand and John. Rand walks around with a sharpened walrus tusk just waiting for any circumstance that would mitigate legal responsibility and allow him to impale someone with this tusk. Rand just so happens to be out and about one day when he sees a woman being stabbed with a Narwhal horn, and he jumps into action, shish kebobbing the attacker's esophagus. He saves the woman's life, and is of course considered a hero by the local yocals. Now imagine John: he is the curator of the local walrus tusk museum. John shudders at the though of walrus tusks being used violently by humans, but, if forced to, would do it to save someones life, because that's just the kind of guy he is. Now he just so happens to be transporting some particularly sharp tusks one day when he happens upon the same scene as Rand. His natural desire to help those in need overrides his reluctance to be violent, and he performs the same action killing the attacker. These two scenarios have identical consequences brought about by identical actions, but are they morally identical? I don't think so. Rand didn't care about saving the woman, that was merely a happy side-effect. He is obviously a fucking maniac with a moral character comparable to Newt Gingrich. An act consequentialist might argue that while John and Rand's actions were equally ethical, Rand in the long run will act more unethically than John because of his psychotic stabby disposition. But can anyone accept a theory that considers both of these actions equally ethical?


So we should find a way to finagle motivation into our moral account. This is where Kant comes in. Motivation for Kant is very important, so important in fact that if a person did the right thing, but for the wrong reason, they would not have acted morally at all (even if the reason is prima facie admirable)! Kant says "if you ain't acting out of duty, you ain't acting moral" (that quote is verbatim by the way). My initial reaction to this is: that's retarded (this is where the "You Kant be Serious" title comes from). John acted out of a desire to help someone, or through instincts grounded in his natural disposition, not out of respect for the moral law, but this seems like a good thing doesn't it? If someone begrudgingly helps someone else in need simply because of duty, they kind of seem like assholes to me. On the other hand if someone enthusiastically helps simply because they like helping people it seems much better (in regards to the test case Kant would say neither John nor Rand acted morally).



But then I read something in Montaigne that made me rethink this whole "Kant is retarded in this instance" stance. Montaigne seemed to think that actions are more virtuous if they are not in your nature to perform. How we are inclined to act is an uncontrollable contingent fact about us. If someone is simply naturally inclined to act right, then they aren't really doing anything too amazing is the essential idea here. Imagine if Barney Frank was asked to preside over a friends gay wedding, his doing this wouldn't really be an exercise in autonomy because he will be naturally inclined to do it. But imagine if Rick Santorum, a venomous anti-gay bigot douchebag asshole, accepted an injunction to preside over a gay wedding, that would be quite the feat! If someone is naturally vile, but does the right thing in spite of this natural fact, then they are acting virtuously, while if someone is naturally pleasant and does the right thing out of inclination or instinct (because they aren't pieces of shit like Santorum) they aren't acting virtuously.

So how can we tie this back to Kant? Well he thinks that someone who does the right thing simply because they like helping (or whatever the case may be) is worthy of praise, but not esteem (basically meaning it is good, but not moral). Montaigne thinks people who face greater difficulties in acting correctly, that do in fact act correctly, are virtuous, while those who just naturally act right are good, but not virtuous. So it is praiseworthy and certainly good that someone acts right from pure inclination, but it isn't moral or virtuous because they aren't exercising autonomy, they are simply acting from instinct.

I think this is wrong, but it does seems to make more sense. You could also argue that on Kant's scheme someone could just be naturally inclined to act out of duty to the moral law, in which case Montaigne wouldn't consider them virtuous, but Kant might consider them moral. I can't really imagine how someone could be naturally inclined to act in accordance with the moral law based on some natural contingency. Self-legislation is important in Kant's theory, and if you act in accordance to some innate moral law you aren't doing it right!


(I think the relevant reading for Montaigne is On Cruelty and for Kant Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals)

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