I've always been interested in the role that motivation ought to play in our moral assessments of any given person's actions. It has always seemed to me that answers to questions like: Why did this person act as they did? or: What beliefs and desires motivated them to act in such a way? should play some role in our judgment of actions. Some moral theories certainly have more trouble accounting for motivation than others, but most can probably accommodate motivation in some way (even if indirectly)
If you don't think motive matters consider this test case:
Imagine two guys: Rand and John. Rand walks around with a sharpened walrus tusk just waiting for any circumstance that would mitigate legal responsibility and allow him to impale someone with this tusk. Rand just so happens to be out and about one day when he sees a woman being stabbed with a Narwhal horn, and he jumps into action, shish kebobbing the attacker's esophagus. He saves the woman's life, and is of course considered a hero by the local yocals. Now imagine John: he is the curator of the local walrus tusk museum. John shudders at the though of walrus tusks being used violently by humans, but, if forced to, would do it to save someones life, because that's just the kind of guy he is. Now he just so happens to be transporting some particularly sharp tusks one day when he happens upon the same scene as Rand. His natural desire to help those in need overrides his reluctance to be violent, and he performs the same action killing the attacker. These two scenarios have identical consequences brought about by identical actions, but are they morally identical? I don't think so. Rand didn't care about saving the woman, that was merely a happy side-effect. He is obviously a fucking maniac with a moral character comparable to Newt Gingrich. An act consequentialist might argue that while John and Rand's actions were equally ethical, Rand in the long run will act more unethically than John because of his psychotic stabby disposition. But can anyone accept a theory that considers both of these actions equally ethical?
So we should find a way to finagle motivation into our moral account. This is where Kant comes in. Motivation for Kant is very important, so important in fact that if a person did the right thing, but for the wrong reason, they would not have acted morally at all (even if the reason is prima facie admirable)! Kant says "if you ain't acting out of duty, you ain't acting moral" (that quote is verbatim by the way). My initial reaction to this is: that's retarded (this is where the "You Kant be Serious" title comes from). John acted out of a desire to help someone, or through instincts grounded in his natural disposition, not out of respect for the moral law, but this seems like a good thing doesn't it? If someone begrudgingly helps someone else in need simply because of duty, they kind of seem like assholes to me. On the other hand if someone enthusiastically helps simply because they like helping people it seems much better (in regards to the test case Kant would say neither John nor Rand acted morally).
But then I read something in Montaigne that made me rethink this whole "Kant is retarded in this instance" stance. Montaigne seemed to think that actions are more virtuous if they are not in your nature to perform. How we are inclined to act is an uncontrollable contingent fact about us. If someone is simply naturally inclined to act right, then they aren't really doing anything too amazing is the essential idea here. Imagine if Barney Frank was asked to preside over a friends gay wedding, his doing this wouldn't really be an exercise in autonomy because he will be naturally inclined to do it. But imagine if Rick Santorum, a venomous anti-gay bigot douchebag asshole, accepted an injunction to preside over a gay wedding, that would be quite the feat! If someone is naturally vile, but does the right thing in spite of this natural fact, then they are acting virtuously, while if someone is naturally pleasant and does the right thing out of inclination or instinct (because they aren't pieces of shit like Santorum) they aren't acting virtuously.
So how can we tie this back to Kant? Well he thinks that someone who does the right thing simply because they like helping (or whatever the case may be) is worthy of praise, but not esteem (basically meaning it is good, but not moral). Montaigne thinks people who face greater difficulties in acting correctly, that do in fact act correctly, are virtuous, while those who just naturally act right are good, but not virtuous. So it is praiseworthy and certainly good that someone acts right from pure inclination, but it isn't moral or virtuous because they aren't exercising autonomy, they are simply acting from instinct.
I think this is wrong, but it does seems to make more sense. You could also argue that on Kant's scheme someone could just be naturally inclined to act out of duty to the moral law, in which case Montaigne wouldn't consider them virtuous, but Kant might consider them moral. I can't really imagine how someone could be naturally inclined to act in accordance with the moral law based on some natural contingency. Self-legislation is important in Kant's theory, and if you act in accordance to some innate moral law you aren't doing it right!
(I think the relevant reading for Montaigne is On Cruelty and for Kant Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals)
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